Abstract: With respect to the issue of the“Campaign against Encirclement and Suppression” in the Central Soviet Area, the Comintern Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CPC initially advocated placing priority on preserving the strength of the Red Army and, if necessary,withdrawing from the soviet area. With the victory of two consecutive “Campaigns against Encirclement and Suppression,” a “Leftist” mood became prominent in the Far Eastern Bureau and the Central Committee of the CPC, and thus they basically no longer contemplated a strategic transfer program and they disagreed with the Comintern Executive Committee. Therefore, the fifth “Campaign against Encirclement and Suppression”began in the absence of a strategic transfer plan. After the Red Army suffered heavy losses, the Far Eastern Bureau and the Central Committee of the CPC were forced to make preparations for a strategic shift,and they reached a consensus with the Comintern Executive Committee. However, in the summer of 1934 the Comintern Executive Committee and the Far Eastern Bureau were hoping to turn the defeat into a victory through military action and, as a result,the Central Committee of the CPC did not contemplate a strategic transfer. In addition, the ideas of the Communist International Executive Committee and the CPC Central Committee, focusing on Sichuan,Shaanxi, and then on developing the Northwest Soviet area,also had a profound impact on the final choice in terms of a strategic shift in the direction of the Central Red Army.
The Chinese version appeared in CPC History Studies, 2017(04).